

Compilers and Formal Languages

Email: christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk

Slides & Progs: KEATS (also homework is there)

1 Introduction, Languages	6 While-Language
2 Regular Expressions, Derivatives	7 Compilation, JVM
3 Automata, Regular Languages	8 Compiling Functional Languages
4 Lexing, Tokenising	9 Optimisations
5 Grammars, Parsing	10 LLVM

The Fun Language

```
def fib(n) = if n == 0 then 0
             else if n == 1 then 1
                 else fib(n - 1) + fib(n - 2);
```

```
def fact(n) = if n == 0 then 1 else n * fact(n - 1);
```

```
def ack(m, n) = if m == 0 then n + 1
                 else if n == 0 then ack(m - 1, 1)
                     else ack(m - 1, ack(m, n - 1));
```

```
def gcd(a, b) = if b == 0 then a else gcd(b, a % b);
```

Factorial Funct. on the JVM

```
.method public static fact(II)I
.limit locals 2
.limit stack 6
  iload 0
  ldc 0
  if_icmpne If_else_2
  iload 1
  goto If_end_3
If_else_2:
  iload 0
  ldc 1
  isub
  iload 0
  iload 1
  imul
  invokestatic fact/fact/fact(II)I
If_end_3:
  ireturn
end method
```

```
def fact(n, acc) =
  if n == 0 then acc
  else fact(n - 1, n * acc);
```

LLVM


Chris Lattner, Vikram Adve (started in 2000)

Apple hired Lattner in 2006

modular architecture, LLVM-IR

11i and 11c

LLVM: Overview



LLVM-IR

```
define i32 @fact (i32 %n) {  
    %tmp_19 = icmp eq i32 %n, 0  
    br i1 %tmp_19, label %if_br_23, label %else_br_24
```

```
if_br_23:  
    ret i32 1
```

```
else_br_24:  
    %tmp_21 = sub i32 %n, 1  
    %tmp_22 = call i32 @fact (i32 %tmp_21)  
    %tmp_20 = mul i32 %n, %tmp_22  
    ret i32 %tmp_20  
}
```

```
def fact(n) =  
    if n == 0 then 1  
    else n * fact(n - 1)
```

LLVM Types

boolean	i1
byte	i8
short	i16
char	i16
integer	i32
long	i64
float	float
double	double
*_	pointer to
**_	pointer to a pointer to
[_]	arrays of

LLVM-IR Instructions

```
br i1 %var, label %if_br, label %else_br
```

```
icmp eq i32 %x, %y ; for equal
```

```
icmp sle i32 %x, %y ; signed less or equal
```

```
icmp slt i32 %x, %y ; signed less than
```

```
icmp ult i32 %x, %y ; unsigned less than
```

```
%var = call i32 @foo(...args...)
```


SSA Format

$(1 + a) + (3 + (b * 5))$

```
tmp0 = add 1 a
```

```
tmp1 = mul b 5
```

```
tmp2 = add 3 tmp1
```

```
tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2
```

Static Single Assignment

Abstract Syntax Trees

```
// Fun language (expressions)
abstract class Exp
abstract class BExp

case class Call(name: String, args: List[Exp]) extends Exp
case class If(a: BExp, e1: Exp, e2: Exp) extends Exp
case class Write(e: Exp) extends Exp
case class Var(s: String) extends Exp
case class Num(i: Int) extends Exp
case class Aop(o: String, a1: Exp, a2: Exp) extends Exp
case class Sequence(e1: Exp, e2: Exp) extends Exp
case class Bop(o: String, a1: Exp, a2: Exp) extends BExp
```

K-(Intermediate)Language

```
abstract class KExp
```

```
abstract class KVal
```

```
// K-Values
```

```
case class KVar(s: String) extends KVal
```

```
case class KNum(i: Int) extends KVal
```

```
case class Kop(o: String, v1: KVal, v2: KVal) extends KVal
```

```
case class KCall(o: String, vrs: List[KVal]) extends KVal
```

```
case class KWrite(v: KVal) extends KVal
```

```
// K-Expressions
```

```
case class KIf(x1: String, e1: KExp, e2: KExp) extends KExp
```

```
case class KLet(x: String, v: KVal, e: KExp) extends KExp
```

```
case class KReturn(v: KVal) extends KExp
```

KLet

```
tmp0 = add 1 a  
tmp1 = mul b 5  
tmp2 = add 3 tmp1  
tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2
```

```
KLet tmp0 , add 1 a in  
  KLet tmp1 , mul b 5 in  
    KLet tmp2 , add 3 tmp1 in  
      KLet tmp3 , add tmp0 tmp2 in  
        ...
```

```
case class KLet(x: String, e1: KVal, e2: KExp)
```

KLet

```
tmp0 = add 1 a  
tmp1 = mul b 5  
tmp2 = add 3 tmp1  
tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2
```

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in  
  let tmp1 = mul b 5 in  
    let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in  
      let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in  
        ...
```

```
case class KLet(x: String, e1: KVal, e2: KExp)
```

CPS-Translation

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =  
  e match { ... }
```

the continuation k can be thought of:

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in  
let tmp1 = mul □ 5 in  
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in  
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in  
KReturn tmp3
```

CPS-Translation

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =  
  e match {  
    case Var(s) => k(KVar(s))  
    case Num(i) => k(KNum(i))  
    ...  
  }
```

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in  
let tmp1 = mul □ 5 in  
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in  
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in  
  KReturn tmp3
```

CPS-Translation

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp = e match {  
  case Aop(o, e1, e2) => {  
    val z = Fresh("tmp")  
    CPS(e1)(y1 =>  
      CPS(e2)(y2 =>  
        KLet(z, Kop(o, y1, y2), k(KVar(z))))))  
  } ...  
}
```

```
...  
let z = op  $\square_{y_1}$   $\square_{y_2}$   
let tmp0 = add 1 a in  
let tmp1 = mul  $\square_z$  5 in  
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in  
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in  
KReturn tmp3
```


CPS-Translation

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =  
  e match {  
    case Sequence(e1, e2) =>  
      CPS(e1)(_ => CPS(e2)(y2 => k(y2)))  
    ...  
  }
```

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in  
let tmp1 = mul □ 5 in  
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in  
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in  
  KReturn tmp3
```

CPS-Translation

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =  
  e match {  
    ...  
    case If(Bop(o, b1, b2), e1, e2) => {  
      val z = Fresh("tmp")  
      CPS(b1)(y1 =>  
        CPS(b2)(y2 =>  
          KLet(z, Kop(o, y1, y2),  
              KIf(z, CPS(e1)(k), CPS(e2)(k))))))  
    }  
    ...  
  }
```

The Basic Language, 1980+

```
5 LET S = 0
10 INPUT V
20 PRINT "Input number"
30 IF N = 0 THEN GOTO 99
40 FOR I = 1 TO N
45 LET S = S + V(I)
50 NEXT I
60 PRINT S/N
70 GOTO 5
99 END
```

“Spaghetti Code”

Target Specific ASM

```
llc -march=x86-64 fact.ll
```

```
llc -march=arm fact.ll
```

```
Intel:  xorl  %eax, %eax
```


```
ARM:    mov   pc, lr
```


**Using a compiler,
how can you mount the
perfect attack against a system?**

What is a **perfect** attack?


1. you can potentially completely take over a target system
2. your attack is (nearly) undetectable
3. the victim has (almost) no chance to recover

clean
compiler





my compiler (src)



Scala


host language

my compiler (src)




host language

my compiler (src)




Scala




Scala

...




Scala



host language

my compiler (src)




...



Scala

Scala

host language



Scala



...

...

no host language
needed

Hacking Compilers



Ken Thompson
Turing Award, 1983

Ken Thompson showed how to hide a Trojan Horse in a compiler **without** leaving any traces in the source code.

No amount of source level verification will protect you from such Thompson-hacks.

Hacking Compilers



Ken Thompson
Turing Award, 1983



- 1) *Assume you ship the compiler as binary and also with sources.*
- 2) *Make the compiler aware when it compiles itself.*
- 3) *Add the Trojan horse.*
- 4) *Compile.*
- 5) *Delete Trojan horse from the sources of the compiler.*
- 6) *Go on holiday for the rest of your life.
;o)*

e a Tro-
ng any
on will
acks.

Hacking Compilers



Ken Thompson
Turing Award, 1983

Ken Thompson showed how to hide a Trojan Horse in a compiler **without** leaving any traces in the source code.

No amount of source level verification will protect you from such Thompson-hacks.

Dijkstra on Testing

“Program testing can be a very effective way to show the presence of bugs, but it is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence.”

What is good about compilers: the either seem to work, or go horribly wrong (most of the time).

Proving Programs to be Correct

Theorem: There are infinitely many prime numbers.

Proof ...

similarly

Theorem: The program is doing what it is supposed to be doing.


Long, long proof ...

This can be a gigantic proof. The only hope is to have help from the computer. 'Program' is here to be understood to be quite general (compiler, OS, ...).

Can This Be Done?

in 2008, verification of a small C-compiler

“if my input program has a certain behaviour, then the compiled machine code has the same behaviour”
is as good as gcc -O1, but much, much less buggy



Fuzzy Testing C-Compilers

tested GCC, LLVM and others by randomly generating C-programs

found more than 300 bugs in GCC and also many in LLVM (some of them highest-level critical)

about CompCert:

“The striking thing about our CompCert results is that the middle-end bugs we found in all other compilers are absent. As of early 2011, the under-development version of CompCert is the only compiler we have tested for which Csmith cannot find wrong-code errors. This is not for lack of trying: we have devoted about six CPU-years to the task.”

Next Week

Revision Lecture

How many strings are in $L(a^*)$?

Next Week

Revision Lecture

How many strings are in $L(a^*)$?

How many strings are in $L((a + b)^*)$?

Are there more than in $L(a^*)$?

