\documentclass[dvipsnames,14pt,t]{beamer}
\usepackage{../slides}
\usepackage{../langs}
\usepackage{../data}
\usepackage{../graphics}
\usepackage{soul}

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% beamer stuff
\renewcommand{\slidecaption}{AFL 10, King's College London}
\newcommand{\bl}[1]{\textcolor{blue}{#1}}       


\begin{document}

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\begin{frame}[t]
\frametitle{%
  \begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}
  \\[-3mm]
  \LARGE Automata and \\[-2mm] 
  \LARGE Formal Languages (10)\\[3mm] 
  \end{tabular}}

  \normalsize
  \begin{center}
  \begin{tabular}{ll}
  Email:  & christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk\\
  Office: & S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)\\
  Slides: & KEATS (also home work is there)\\
  \end{tabular}
  \end{center}

\end{frame}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]

\large\bf
Using a compiler, \\how can you mount the\\ perfect attack against a system?

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

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\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]

{\large\bf
What is a \alert{perfect} attack?}\bigskip

\begin{enumerate}
\item you can potentially completely take over a target system
\item your attack is (nearly) undetectable
\item the victim has (almost) no chance to recover
\end{enumerate}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]


  \begin{center}
  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
  
  \onslide<1->{
  \node (A) at (0,0)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=17mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (A.north west) {\footnotesize\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}
  \only<1,2>{clean}\only<3->{\alert{hacked}}\\compiler\end{tabular}};}


  \onslide<2->{
  \node (B) at (-2,2)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=10mm, minimum width=12mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (B.north west) {\footnotesize\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}login\\(src)\end{tabular}};
  
  \node (C) at (2,2)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=10mm, minimum width=12mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (C.north west) {\footnotesize\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}login\\(bin)\end{tabular}};

  \draw[->, line width=2mm] (B) -- (C);
  }
  
 \onslide<3->{\node [above left=-1.5mm] at (C.south east) {\footnotesize \alert{$\blacksquare$}};}

  \end{tikzpicture}
  \end{center}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]

  \begin{center}
  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
  
  \onslide<1->{
  \node (A) at (0,0)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (A.north west) {\small V0.01};
  \node [below right] (A1) at (A.south west) {\small Scala};
  \node [below right] (A1) at (A1.south west) {\small\textcolor{gray}{host language}};
  \node [above right] at (A.north west) {my compiler (src)};}

  \onslide<2->{
  \node (B) at (1.8,0)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (B.north west) {\small V0.02};
  \node [below right] at (B.south west) {\small Scala};
  \node at (3,0) {\ldots};

  \node (C) at (5,0)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (C.north west) {\small V1.00};
  \node [below right] at (C.south west) {\small Scala};}

  \onslide<3->{
  \node (D) at (6.8,0)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (D.north west) {\small V1.00};

  \node (E) at (6.8,2)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (E.north west) {\small V1.01};}
  
  \onslide<4->{
  \node (F) at (8.6,0)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (F.north west) {\small V1.01};

  \node (G) at (8.6,2)  [draw=black, rectangle, very thick, minimum height=18mm, minimum width=14mm] {};
  \node [below right] at (G.north west) {\small V1.02};
  \node at (9.8,0) {\ldots};
  \node at (9.8,2) {\ldots};
  \node at (8,-2) {\textcolor{gray}{\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}no host language\\needed\end{tabular}}};
  }
  
  \end{tikzpicture}
  \end{center}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   


  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \mode<presentation>{
  \begin{frame}<1-3>
  \frametitle{\LARGE\begin{tabular}{c}Hacking Compilers 
  \end{tabular}}
  
  %Why is it so paramount to have a small trusted code base (TCB)?
  \bigskip\bigskip

  \begin{columns}
  \begin{column}{2.7cm}
  \begin{minipage}{2.5cm}%
  \begin{tabular}{c@ {}}
  \includegraphics[scale=0.2]{../pics/ken-thompson.jpg}\\[-1.8mm]
  \footnotesize Ken Thompson\\[-1.8mm]
  \footnotesize Turing Award, 1983\\
  \end{tabular}
  \end{minipage}
  \end{column}
  \begin{column}{9cm}
  \begin{tabular}{l@ {\hspace{1mm}}p{8cm}}
 
  & Ken Thompson showed how to hide a Trojan Horse in a 
  compiler \textcolor{red}{without} leaving any traces in the source code.\\[2mm]
  
  & No amount of source level verification will protect 
  you from such Thompson-hacks.\\[2mm]

  & Therefore in safety-critical systems it is important to rely 
  on only a very small TCB.
  \end{tabular}
  \end{column}
  \end{columns}

  \only<2>{
  \begin{textblock}{6}(4,2)
  \begin{tikzpicture}
  \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=3mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] 
  {\normalsize
  \begin{minipage}{8cm}
  \begin{quote}
  \includegraphics[scale=0.05]{../pics/evil.png}
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item[1)] Assume you ship the compiler as binary and also with sources.
  \item[2)] Make the compiler aware when it compiles itself.
  \item[3)] Add the Trojan horse.
  \item[4)] Compile.
  \item[5)] Delete Trojan horse from the sources of the compiler.
  \item[6)] Go on holiday for the rest of your life. ;o)\\[-7mm]\mbox{}
  \end{enumerate}
  \end{quote}
  \end{minipage}};
  \end{tikzpicture}
  \end{textblock}}

  \end{frame}}
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     



\end{document}

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